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Abstract This paper presents an analytical framework that allows us to evaluate the
performance of dynamic governance structures. In housing development processes, gov-
ernance structures—markets, hierarchies and network or relational structures—change as
the process proceeds, and so do the goals that are set by all stakeholders, including local
authorities. A framework for evaluation is set out that takes account of this temporal
component. It is applied empirically to three case studies in the city of Arnhem (The
Netherlands). The paper concludes that the effectiveness of steering housing production by
local authorities depends on choosing appropriate governance structures, setting realistic
goals, and a local authority that acts accordingly. Many of the choices with regard to goals
and governance structures are not made autonomously but are structured by the spatial and
institutional context in which they operate. A systematic evaluation of the performance of
governance structures, within their context, could improve local government’s capacity to
steer housing production.
Keywords Governance structures  Housing development  Location development 
Land policy
1 Introduction
In recent years, many have pointed to a shift from government to governance. This means
that the dominant position of the state has changed, whereby the government agency is
now co-producer of policy together with other public and private parties. This applies to
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many policy areas, including housing and housing production (see Fig. 1). Due to various
institutional changes (Korthals Altes 2007; De Kam 2007), Dutch housing associations no
longer get grants for delivering affordable houses. They need to finance that segment out of
their revolving fund or by building market-rate houses. Also the role of property devel-
opers has become much more prominent due to institutional changes (Groetelaers 2004).
Municipalities used to have a monopoly on land, which they often sold off cheaply to
housing associations. In addition, local councils even provided council houses themselves.
Both positions have changed. Although municipalities often still pursue an active land
policy, they have got company from developers that do the same. The provision of council
houses has even disappeared completely (Fig. 1). For that reason, housing production has
become more dependent on fluctuations on the housing market and in house prices
(Korthals Altes 2007).
In general, the number of stakeholders in developing projects and providing houses has
risen. Co-production is a logical result. Local governments have become more dependent
on others for achieving their goals. An interesting question in this respect is whether and
how governments can achieve their goals.
The aim of the paper is twofold. We want to set up a framework to analyse and evaluate
what we call the steering capacity of governance structures to guide the building pro-
duction—both quantitatively and qualitatively—in a direction that local governments want.
The second aim is to reveal what really influences this capacity and the housing production
at the project level by applying the framework empirically. This paper is mainly based on
an empirical research project that was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Housing
(Buitelaar et al. 2006) and therefore regards the Dutch context. What we do not intend is to
provide definitive answers as to whether governance structures that steer housing pro-
duction in The Netherlands are effective or not. That would require a different, more
quantitative approach.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we will present a conceptual
exploration of governance structures, drawing on the neo-institutional economic literature.
Then a framework for evaluating the performance of governance structures is set up. This
framework has been applied empirically to housing projects in the city of Arnhem, one on
which we report in this paper. The paper concludes with a review of the performance of
governance structures regarding housing in Dutch municipalities and with some comments































































Fig. 1 Housing production in
The Netherlands, subdivided by
commissioner, between 1950 and
2006. Source: CBS
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2 Governance structures1
We are mainly concerned with the institutions or rules that guide interaction between (and
not within) organisations: the governance structures. This is a concept that originates from
the field of new institutional economics. A governance structure is ‘‘an institutional
framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided.’’
(Williamson 1996: 11). Governance structures are therefore institutional arrangements that
structure transactions between individuals and organisations. In new institutional economics,
there is a distinction between governance structures and the institutional environment. The
institutional environment is described as the legal, social and political rules that determine
the context within which economic activity takes place (Williamson 1990). Williamson
(1990) takes the institutional environment as a given. In the next section we choose not to do
so but to look at how it affects the use of governance structures. In general, a distinction is
made between market structures, hierarchical structures and a third form, which we call
network or relational structures. These three ideal types will be distinguished below.
2.1 Market
Markets have been the subject of many articles and books and hence numerous definitions
circulate in economics as well as in the social sciences in general. Although neo-classical
economists cannot understand markets satisfactorily (see e.g. Coase 1988), due to a lack of
attention for institutions and an overemphasis on explaining prices, this does not mean they
have no definition of markets. However these definitions are often not institutional and
regard the market as an assembly of buyers and sellers. Hirschman (1982: 1473), for
instance, describes markets as a ‘‘large number of price-taking anonymous buyers and
sellers supplied with perfect information [who] function without any prolonged human or
social contract between the parties. Under perfect competition there is no room for bar-
gaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual adjustment and the various operators that
contract together need not enter into recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of
which they would get to know each other well.’’
Coase (1988: 7) focuses like most institutional economists on the institutional nature of
markets: ‘‘Markets are institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in
order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions.’’ Hodgson uses a similar
definition: ‘‘… markets involve multiple exchanges, multiple buyers and multiple sellers,
and thereby a degree of competition. A market is an institution in which a significant
number of commodities of a particular, reasonably well-defined type are regularly
exchanged.’’ (Hodgson 2002: 44) What is not apparent in Coase’s definition, and gets more
attention in Hodgson’s description, is the element of competition, which Hirschman
emphasises as well. In a classical market, or thick market as Williamson (1996: 378) calls
it, with very many buyers and sellers, there will be full competition. In cases of full
competition, it is the price which brings demand and supply in equilibrium, and therewith
governs the way people transact. Individual buyers and sellers have very little influence on
these market prices.
This pure market form, in which personal contacts, identity or experience do not exist, is
rare. The actions of individuals are embedded (Granovetter 1985) in cultural peculiarities.
In addition, in many cases there are not multiple sellers, but oligopolies or monopolies.
What makes pure markets almost non-existent in the case of land exchanges and land use
1 This section stems largely from Buitelaar (2007, chapter 2)
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planning is the nature of the good ‘land’. This becomes clear when we look at a part of
Hodgson’s earlier mentioned definition: ‘‘a significant number of commodities’’ (Hodgson
2002: 44). But in the case of land, the word commodity hardly applies, since every piece of
land is unique and immobile, which makes it irreplaceable by other tracts of land. In
addition, the number of buyers and sellers is often limited. This leads to situations in which
people have to rely on each other and exchange is co-ordinated by other mechanisms than
price, like trust, as Needham and De Kam (2004) show for the exchanges of land for
affordable housing between municipalities and housing associations.
It must be noted that there are also many other broader descriptions of markets, in which
exchange can take many forms (Lindblom 2001). But for the sake of conceptual clarity, we
prefer to use the relatively narrow description of the market, and we label voluntary
exchanges by means other than the price mechanism, like for instance trust, as relational
structures.
2.2 Hierarchy
Government agencies can and often do use authority to make sure that other organisations
act in a desired way. This ‘way’ is often in the public interest, or at least it is assumed to be.
In the literature hierarchical governance structures also apply to the private sector.
Moreover, Coase’s (1937) theory of the (private) firm was the starting point of the initial
market—hierarchy dichotomy. We are concerned with the public sector and its steering
capacity with regard to housing development. McGuinness (1991) gives a good definition
of hierarchy, that applies to hierarchies in general. He regards hierarchies as ‘‘a class of
governance whose distinguishing feature is that a resource owner accepts restrictions (often
simply because he has to) on his sole rights to use his resources in whatever way he might
choose. Within those bounds of some agreed domain, he allows his resources to be con-
trolled by an authorised decision-making unit to which he might or might not belong.’’
(McGuinness 1991: 74–75, parenthesis by authors).
It is also important to make a distinction between hierarchical structures between or-
ganisations and within, i.e. the firm or public agencies. Like Bromley (1989) and North
(1990), we distinguish between institutions and organisations, regarding organisations as
the ‘players’ that act within the institutions, ‘the rules of the game’. With this distinction,
firms and government agencies are treated as organisations and hierarchical governance
structures, like zoning, as institutional arrangements between organisations.2
There are instruments that can be used within hierarchical governance.3 Zoning des-
ignates—some would say separates—land uses by restricting the exercise of property
rights. Besides zoning there are also hierarchical tools that are used to take property rights.4
In The Netherlands, we should think of two policy instruments in particular. One is
compulsory purchase which provides municipalities with the possibility to expropriate
property owners, against complete compensation of income or capital loss. The other
instrument is imposing a pre-emption right. This gives local authorities the right—for a
designated area—to be the first buyer in case a property owner wants to sell his land.
2 There are also institutions within organisations.
3 Note that instruments and governance structures are intertwined but not the same. Governance structures
tell something about the kind of relationship between actors, while instruments are the tools used within that
relationship. It is through instruments that governance structures take effect.
4 Note that in the US zoning can also go as far as to constitute a (regulatory) taking.
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2.3 Relational or network structures
One of the main criticisms of transaction cost economics has long been the dichotomy that
was set up between market and hierarchy (see e.g. Powell 1991; Thompson et al. 1991). It was
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) who argued first that firms, i.e. hierarchies, and markets
are alternative modes of governance. But since the 1980s, new institutional economists as
well as other disciplines began to appreciate the importance of long-term relationships,
reciprocity and collaboration, instead of the anonymous price mechanism in market struc-
tures or the use of authority in hierarchical structures. The most common term for this third
category are networks (see Thompson et al. 1991; Thorelli 1986; Kickert et al. 1997).
Hodgson speaks of relational structures (Hodgson 2002). We will use them interchangeably.
A network can be defined as a structure or an arrangement in which ‘‘two or more
organisations (are) involved in long-term relationships.’’ (Thorelli 1986: 37, parenthesis
ours). In line with our discussion on hierarchies this definition focuses on the governance
structures between organisations and not within; the following description seems to direct
its attention to the latter. ‘‘When discussing networks, in the first instance at least, it is
probably institutional arrangements like informal groups, mutual-aid organisations, small-
scale and local institutional networks, cooperative forms of social existence, self-help
groups, and so on that come immediately to mind.’’ (Thompson 2003).
As a reaction to the critiques of the market—hierarchy distinction, it became popular to
argue that the boundaries between them are fuzzy and indistinct. New ideas like ‘quasi-
markets’, ‘hybrid forms’ (e.g. Williamson 1985); relational contracting (e.g. Richardson
1972; Williamson 1985) and ‘internal markets’ began to gain attention (Hodgson 2002).
Some also position the term networks between markets and hierarchies (Thorelli 1986).
This is the result of the observation made by many that a lot of transactions do not take
place through markets (North 1977), nor through hierarchies. In every exchange there is
some implicit or explicit legal contract, leading to an exchange of property rights. But not
all exchanges have the competitive and transient features that market exchanges have
(Hodgson 1988), nor the features of imposed rules or authority which hierarchies have.
Reciprocity and collaboration are central features of these governance structures.
But arraying exchanges along a continuum with the market on one end and hierarchy on
the other is misleading and does not do justice to the complexity of reality (Powell 1991).
Hodgson (2002) argues that the existence of a third category should not imply that we do not
need to conceptualise markets and hierarchies; the distinction between them is not blurred.
Rather, there is (at least) a third distinct category: relational structures. But although
markets, hierarchies and relational structures are distinct governance structures, they can
nevertheless co-exist, as we will see in the case study. In the empirical part we will see that
local governments participate in, or use, both hierarchical and relational structures.
Relational or network structures between organisations related to housing development
can be found in all sorts of agreements like intention or development agreements between key
stakeholders. But also more tacit long-term relationships like between housing associations
and municipalities should be included. We will see examples of these in the empirical part.
3 Evaluating the steering capacity
The evaluation of the capacity of local governments to steer the housing production at
specific locations differs from related capacity concepts like institutional capacity (Healey
1997) and governance capacity (Innes and Booher 2003). Where our analysis focuses on
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the issue of effectiveness of governance structures in the light of government goals, these
two concepts—introduced by collaborative planning theorists—focus on the ability to act
collectively, irrespective of the direction of those actions. The goals and the products are
seen as endogenous to the collaborative process. Setting goals is a collective process, just
like implementing them. The institutional and governance capacity is assumed to be high if
stakeholders are able to act collectively, allowing a diversity of opinions to be raised, and if
this collective is able to respond accurately to a rapidly changing world. What comes out of
the process is ‘good’ when it is produced collectively. This is a valuable and worthwhile
perspective, albeit not uncontested (Neuman 2000).
Because of collective action problems we have a government. Our normative stance is that
the interest and the position of the government is not just like any other stakeholder’s.
Therefore, we look at governance structures, and their effectiveness, from the perspective of
local governments and the goals they set for themselves. We use the concept steering capacity
for that purpose. It is regarded here as the capacity to steer the actions of other agents
(like housing associations and property developers) in a particular, preferred—by the one who
tries to steer—direction. What the direction is, is not always known in advance but articu-
lated during the process, in interaction with others. We do not evaluate whether strategic
housing policy or spatial planning is effective (see e.g. Mastop and Faludi 1997), since that
assumes a clear division between policy-making and goal-setting on the one hand and
implementation on the other. The problem with evaluating effectiveness is to separate ends
and means entirely. As Lindblom (1959) argues: ‘‘… one simultaneously chooses a policy to
attain certain objectives and chooses the objectives themselves.’’ We will pay attention to this
reciprocity, which is conceptualised in Fig. 2. The governance structures through which
housing development is co-ordinated depend on the goals set by the local government, but also
on the goals and actions of other actors that are connected to the local government through
some form of governance structure. These actors are influenced, or maybe even steered, by the
governance structure at the same time. But the goals local governments set are not chosen
randomly, they are derived from the (im)possibilities offered by other agents and the gov-
ernance structures at hand. All the decisions are not taken autonomously but take place within
an institutional context. What this makes clear is that an evaluation of governance structures
alone does not make sense. The way people deal with them, and the institutional context within
which they do that, is indispensably related to those governance structures (Giddens 1984).
The way these factors interact does not remain the same throughout the whole devel-
opment process. To unravel these interdependencies, we have divided three development
projects in steering stages (Buitelaar et al. 2006). Each of these is a stage in the devel-
opment process that is ended and marked by a clear decision, whether or not in a
favourable direction. These stages are not necessarily sequential but can be partly parallel.
Per stage, the following questions have been addressed.
1. What were the municipal goals preceding the steering stage?
2. Through which governance structure are the goals pursued?
Institutional context 
Goals/actions local 







Fig. 2 Analytical framework
190 E. Buitelaar, G. de Kam
123
Governance structures, instruments and goals are not chosen out of an infinite range of
alternatives. Their selection is strongly affected by the institutional context and by the
actions of other agents. Land ownership constraints, legislation and informal rules and
practises all play their role in ‘choosing’ governance structures and goals. They therefore
also affect the steering capacity.
3. Why were the goals and governance structures chosen that have been chosen, and were
there any alternatives?
Although goals and means are often simultaneously chosen this does not automatically
lead to effectiveness. There is much uncertainty about future events. And therefore
municipalities can do no more than make assumptions about the steering capacity of
governance structures.
4. What are the assumptions behind the working of the governance structure?
Then it is important to look at the governance structures in action: the process.
5. How did the steering process go?
The above questions all regard the steering capacity within a given institutional context.
The context affects the governance structures. Would the governance structure that is in
place be different under a different context? For instance, would there be a difference if
new policy instruments were available?
6. Would there have been a wish for new policy instruments at the beginning of the
steering stage if those would have been available, and have concessions been made to
the goals and ambitions because of a lack of those instruments?
These questions were the focal point in the empirical research. We held interviews with
the key stakeholders (eight interviewees) and did extensive archival research on the project
files that have been made available to us by the municipality of Arnhem.
4 Empirical application
The empirical part of this paper reports on only one of the three case studies, because our
aim is to illustrate the application of the framework. Applying it to all cases would stretch
the paper beyond the size that is appropriate for an article.
De Hofpoort is located close to the railway station in the centre of the city of Arnhem,
and consists of a slightly sloping site of about 1.2 ha. Before the new development, the
area was designated in the land use plan for housing, retail, commercial enterprises and
public amenities. The main initial occupation of the land was the supermarket, owned by a
local real estate developer and let to a national chain of supermarkets. Apart from that, the
municipality had land on the site. This made the municipality and the real estate developer
interdependent which positioned them mostly in relational or network structures.
Hofpoort became a potential site for redevelopment of housing when the national
government adopted a scheme of large-scale and long-term agreements with local
authorities, aiming at the simultaneous development of greenfield as well as inner-city
areas. Although Hofpoort had already turned out to be an expensive site (because of its
slope and soil contamination), it got higher priority in the early 1990s. That was because
other developments in the general agreement were confronted with serious delay, jeop-
ardising the subsidies the national government had made dependent on a certain amount of
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housing construction. Therefore, the city of Arnhem decided to make available two million
Euros for subsidising the site, on the condition that this would be paid only when the
building permit had been granted.
In the development process of the project the following four steering stages can be
identified. Within these stages we see relational and hierarchical structures and combi-
nations of both. During the first stage the municipality and the real estate developer
committed themselves to the re-development of the site and made their first deals about
their roles and about the transactions of land. This stage was concluded by signing the
intention agreement. At the second stage parties started the actual planning process; this is
when municipal goals shifted from process-related goals to substantial goals. The local
authority used the intention agreement to steer the development. This stage ended when the
City Council refused to submit the plan for formal approval, because there were strong
objections from the neighbouring residents. In the third stage the planning started anew, in
a more participatory way and with adapted municipal goals. This stage was concluded by
formal approval of the plan for the site. At the fourth and last stage, parties focussed on the
actual realisation, laying down their agreement in a detailed contract and in specifications
for the public amenities. We will now apply our framework to analyse these successive
stages.
Stage 1: The initiative and the initial agreement
This stage is entered because the local authority has given higher priority to developing
the site in order to meet the terms of its city-wide construction agreements with the
national government.
1 Municipal goals set for this stage
The city wanted to come to an agreement for redevelopment of the site, including the re-
location of the supermarket within a reasonable period of time. It wanted a plan
conforming to its conditions with respect to finance, housing, city planning and
preservation of existing monuments. The plan should consist of 100 dwellings in an
architectural design that fits within the environment, preferably with 30% social housing
in line with the city’s strategic housing policy. The city was willing to grant a subsidy to
a maximum of two million euros, and in return for that it wanted to have a say in the
choice of the architect of the plan. And finally the city wanted to agree upon the roles its
private partners would play in the planning and development process. What the city had
in mind was to develop the land itself in order to control the quality of land
readjustment, to engage its own municipal engineering department and to fully recoup
all of the costs of land development.
2 Use of governance structures and instruments
In this stage both parties were related to each other in network structures with
hierarchical measures in the background. The first important instrument the municipality
used was the subsidy, which would be granted on the condition that the developer would
actually start construction. The second instrument was based on the fact that in order to
achieve his goals, the developer would need a revision of the land use plan. That enabled
the local authority to steer by setting the conditions of this revision. And the agreement
was to be concluded in a letter of intent, largely based on mutual trust.
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3 The reasons behind the choice of goals and the way the governance structures were set
up
The Hofpoort site was given priority because the local authority knew that private
owners were willing to co-operate in development. The other municipal goals can be
seen as elements of the local planning policy and planning culture. The instruments the
government chose were vital for the property developer. Subsidies were necessary and
used. And the public land use plan had to be revised. So the choice of instruments was
rather obvious, placing the municipality in a relatively strong position in the planning
process.
4 Assumptions regarding the functioning of the governance structure
The city assumed that its instruments would be sufficient to come to an agreement by
mutual arrangement with its private partners. On the basis of this agreement a plan
would be designed in accordance with the municipal conditions.
5 The outcome of the process
Parties were relatively content with the process at this stage. Contrary to its original
intentions, the local authority decided to refrain from readjusting the land itself. The city
gave in to the wish of the private developer, because it wanted to carry out the land
readjustment itself. So it agreed on private land readjustment, using its legal public
power to specify the desired quality of public amenities to be realised by the private
developer. All other municipal goals have been achieved by the terms of the contract,
the authority to review building plans and grant building permits, and by having a say in
the choice of the architect. The number of dwellings in that version of the plan was 95,
and the developer would pay for the municipal planning costs, whereas the city would
contribute by using its subsidy. Due to reluctance on the part of the supermarket—for
reasons not related to the redevelopment of the Hofpoort site—it took several years
before the contract could be signed.
6 Would other steering instruments have been needed?
The negotiations ‘under the shadow of law’ (Scharpf 1997), in combination with the
subsidy, have worked out well for achieving the municipal goals at this stage. The delay
in signing the contract has been caused by external factors. Looking back at this first
steering stage, we may conclude that the city has been able to maintain most of its public
goals related to housing and inner-city development by using planning law, a private
contract and a (conditional) subsidy. The aim to pursue an active land policy—and act as
a private enterprise—has been abandoned, since this was a condition set by the
developer.
Stage 2: The first plan
After the first stage was completed with a contract of intent, the parties started drawing
up plans for redeveloping the Hofpoort site.
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1 Municipal goals set for this stage
The municipal goal for this stage was to have a plan that would conform to the
conditions of the contract while achieving the goals it had with regard to housing, urban
design and preservation of monuments. Parties agreed to have the planning process
follow the lines of ‘design-announce-defend’, which means that the plan-making was the
sole terrain of professionals that had little interaction with the community before
finalising the design.
2 Use of governance structures and instruments
Again, at this stage there was a combination of hierarchical and network structures. The
instruments used at this point are the letter of intent in combination with the legal power
to withhold building permission of construction plans that do not conform to the land use
plan (in revision). The contract stated that the city would take part in the selection of the
architect, and that it would have the right to approve the plans for urban design and lay-
out. These rights could not have been grounded in public planning law alone, and it is
against this background that the local authority intended to achieve its goals by
negotiation with the developer.
3 The reasons behind the choice of goals and the way the governance structures were set
up
The city had few other options because it had committed itself to the letter of intent. At
this stage the ‘exploitation’ of the developers’ need to have the land use plan revised has
lost most of its potential for municipal steering, because the city had stated that it would
co-operate in changing the land use plan for the site. There would have been alternatives
for the planning procedure however, such as a more participatory process. But the city
preferred to prepare a feasible plan with its professional partner, probably because it was
found less risky.
4 Assumptions regarding the functioning of the governance structure
At this second stage two different sets of assumptions were important. The local
authority assumed that its legal planning powers in combination with the contract would
offer sufficient opportunities to steer the outcome of the planning process, and that it
would be possible to speed up this process by good professional preparation. But it also
assumed that the neighbouring residents would be content with this outcome because it
would replace the supermarket and the nuisances it brought by new housing.
5 The outcome of the process
The selection of an architect went smoothly. The architect produced a plan that met all
municipal requirements. At its first public presentation, this plan met with much protest
from the neighbouring residents, mainly because of its massive character. Although it
appeared that these objections could not be taken away by subsequent adaptations of the
plan, the municipal administration—the alderman—nevertheless decided to start the
formal land use planning procedure that would enable the execution of this plan. This
procedure was then blocked in its very first stage by the city council planning
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committee, which was responsive to the public objection. As a consequence, the process
of developing a plan for the Hofpoort site had to start all over again.
6 Would other steering instruments have been needed?
Obviously, the disappointing outcome of this second stage is not due to the lack of
steering capacity of the governance structures and the instruments that have been
applied. Rather, it seems to have to do with the implementation of the governance
structure rather than with its defectiveness. The city administration and its planners seem
to have miscalculated the residents’ opposition, probably because they wanted a quick
deal in order to be able to meet the targets of new housing construction—and the money
attached to them—set by the national government.
Stage 3: The second plan
At this third stage of the planning process the essential goal is to design a plan that will
get sufficient civil support to convince the city Council to approve it, while at the same
time retaining as many goals of the set in the previous stages of the process as possible.
1 Municipal goals set for this stage
The municipality wanted to arrive at a feasible plan for housing at the Hofpoort site in
concert with the residents and the developer, respecting the municipal policy of
preservation of monuments at the site. The city wanted to start up a dialogue with the
residents in order to take away the objections to the plan. And it was willing to ‘buy
consent’ by selling some land to adjacent residents for the extension of their private
backyards.
2 Use of governance structures and instruments
In this stage a network structure was used in which participatory planning played an
important role to get support for a new plan. Although the municipality did not give
away its power of final approval of the plan, it tried to achieve its own goals in first
instance by active involvement in the meetings with residents and the developer, so as to
minimise the risk of losing civil support (again). As a consequence, it had to accept the
possibility that not all municipal goals regarding the content of the plan would be
achieved.
3 The reasons behind the choice of goals and the way the governance structures were set
up
The local authority had few other options, because its own planning committee had
rejected the first plan for reasons of insufficient communication with the public. An
external factor was that some pressure was put on the process because the supermarket
was about to move out of the area, so that land transactions and the related costs would
come into play.
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4 Assumptions regarding the functioning of the governance structure
The city assumed that this participatory process would result in a widely supported plan,
and it realised that it might have to pay a price for that with respect to the content of the
plan. It assumed that a supported plan would be more feasible, and that it would pass the
formal procedures more quickly and at lower costs in terms of transaction costs and
claims for planning compensation.
5 The outcome of the process
The developer decided to invite a new architect who was trusted by the residents to
design the new plan, and the municipality commissioned a new project manager as well.
The participatory planning approach resulted in a draught plan that was supported by the
residents. Based on this draught plan, the formal procedure for revision of the land use
plan was run successfully. In order to make this plan feasible, the local authority had to
accept that the density would go down from more than one hundred to 87 dwellings. The
plan also compromised on the conservation of several monumental vaults on the site.
And it turned out that the residents’ participation in the planning process did not prevent
them from claiming planning compensation for the loss of property value. Two of these
claims are being dealt with by the court.
6 Would another steering instrument have been needed?
In this stage it is not the nature of the steering instruments that changes but the way the
instruments are applied by the local authority, shifting to a more participatory planning
process. This is due to a change in planning approach as well as the ‘sacrifice’ of the
original goal for preserving the monumental vaults on the site, and a reduction in the
number of dwellings to be constructed.
Stage 4: The realisation of the plan and the lay-out of the public space
The land use plan and the general design of the area having been approved, in the final
stage the local authority and the developer had to agree upon the actual construction of
the dwellings and the public amenities of the Hofpoort site.
1 Municipal goals set for this stage
The city wanted the construction of dwellings and public amenities to occur according to
the plans that had been approved. To achieve this it would sell its properties on the site
to the developer, and after completion of the plan it would get back the public spaces in
freehold without charges, designed according to the specifications it has set. Another
goal was to limit municipal expenses on planning costs, which had already exceeded the
budget reserved for that. And finally, the city wanted to conclude its transactions of land
for the extension of backyards with some adjacent residents.
2 Use of governance structures and instruments
The city wanted the construction of dwellings and public amenities to occur according to
the plans that had been approved. To achieve this it would sell its properties on the site
to the developer, and after completion of the plan it would get back the public spaces in
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freehold without charges, designed according to the specifications it has set. Another
goal was to limit municipal expenses on planning costs, which had already exceeded the
budget reserved for that. And finally, the city wanted to conclude its transactions of land
for the extension of backyards with some adjacent residents.
3 The reasons behind the choice of goals and the way the governance structures were set
up
At this stage, negotiation in a network structure was used to reach the desired quality
level for the public space. The most important instrument at this stage was the letter of
intent, containing the basic agreements with the developer. These had to be worked out
in a more detailed agreement. In these negotiations the city—contrarily to the first stage
of the process—could not exert pressure with its subsidy, because this had already been
granted to the land owner as a contribution to the costs of decontamination of the
polluted soil on the site. And because the land use plan had been formally approved, the
city could not threaten to withhold the building permit either—as it could have done in
previous stages. So the only means of power the local authority had at this stage was its
right to refuse to take back the public spaces in case these had not been adjusted to the
required municipal specifications.
4 Assumptions regarding the functioning of the governance structure
The city assumed that the initial contract and the deal with the adjacent residents would
suffice to come to final agreements with the developer.
5 The outcome of the process
The local authority put pressure on the developer to sell the land for extension of the
residents’ backyards at the same price the city itself would charge for similar tracts of
land. As a result a better lay-out of the site could be realised. The details of the design of
public spaces and amenities were less easily agreed upon, mainly because the initial
contract had not been specific enough in this respect. The city repeatedly rejected the
developer’s infrastructural plans. A final matter of negotiation was the municipal goal to
have a public playground on the site. Many of the adjacent residents were opposed to this
because it would be situated behind their houses and they feared that this would lead to a
socially unsafe living environment. By way of compromise it was then agreed that the
playground would become gated, owned and managed by the homeowners association.
6 Would other steering instruments have been needed?
The municipal goals for this stage have been achieved within the governance structure
and with the instruments used. The fact that the property rights of the playground were
transferred to the residents is a political choice rather than a matter of failing instruments
for steering. The problems in the process of detailing the public space were not due to
shortcomings in the instruments either, because the local authority used the available
instrument of withholding its approval effectively. But the process could have run more
smoothly—and at lower costs—if parties had made up a more detailed initial contract
related to this issue.
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5 Conclusions
One of the motives for our empirical research was the doubt that has risen about the
effectiveness of steering housing production, particularly by using hierarchical means of
governance (De Kam 1998). The case studies showed that the city of Arnhem does use its
hierarchical modes of governance, but it seldom does so in a direct way. The hierarchical
way of obtaining property rights by expropriation is not commonly chosen. That is because
it requires a lot of determination and professionalism on the part of the administration. But
it is also because developers can defy expropriation on the grounds that they are willing
and able to realise the project according to municipal specifications.
Most of the public goals have been achieved in the shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf 1997),
and by withholding approval or postponing the formal decision on the land use plan
because that would give the developer the right to build. Relational governance structures
are very important in combination with those hierarchical structures for steering local
housing production. Given a specific setting of property rights, the local authority often
will have to negotiate a contract with the private parties who have an interest in the site.
Several types of contracts have been developed in practise, ranging from a more or less
passive role, to full participation in a joint land development corporation with the
developers.
The less hierarchical the governance structure, the less the outcome can be evaluated
against a set of detailed pre-determined goals. The case studies have shown some of the
factors that make the definition of goals a dynamic element of the planning process as a
whole. It is not only the negotiations with the parties involved in the contract, but also the
dynamics of broader policy goals as well as the interaction with residents and other
stakeholders that contribute to shifting goals. In trying to achieve these goals, the local
authority uses elements of its hierarchical potential all the way through the subsequent
stages of the relational contracting process.
5.1 The role of actors
Governance structures and the use of instruments cannot be evaluated on their own. Much
of the steering capacity will depend on the way these instruments are actually applied and
on the goals actors set. Effectiveness requires not only the efforts of project managers but
also an univocal approach of the different municipal departments involved in a project.
And it calls for consistency in policy of both politics and bureaucracy. On top of several
examples of failing internal municipal co-ordination—including the co-ordination between
administration and council as in the Hofpoort case—we have also observed the negative
effects of a certain path-dependency in the interventions by the administration: things that
have gone wrong in earlier projects tend to be over-corrected in the next project at the
expense of other issues that are equally important to achieve the desired outcome.
In the case studies we also saw that goals are sometimes moving targets; they change
now and again. Many changes in goals were not so much the result of insufficient use or
lack of instruments, but rather of deliberate choices. An example is dropping the number of
houses to 87 for the benefit of the neighbourhood. In these circumstances, there is no lack
of steering capacity of governance. Spatial planning is the art of trading off interests and
land use claims. Housing production (in quantitative terms) is not the only interest.
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5.2 The institutional environment
The actions of agents cannot be understood without paying attention to the context within
which they operate. For instance, actors have to deal with property market and budgetary
constraints. This means that the efforts of steering housing production should be under-
stood in a broad spatial and institutional context. Spatial relationships become important
when functions—like the supermarket in the Hofpoort case—have to be relocated, when
complex functions have to be integrated, when sites are part of larger spatial plans, or when
co-ordination of housing production at different sites is at stake. The broader institutional
context in which (the steering of) a project should be understood encompasses not only the
overall dynamics of municipal policy but also many aspects of the relations between the
municipality and other parties involved. In the Hofpoort case the selection of architects
was a typical example of the influence of existing relations. In the other two cases the
existing long-term relationship between the city and some of the local housing associations
had a distinct influence on the outcome of the steering process. And the city of Arnhem—
like many others—turned out to be most reluctant to use its instrument of expropriation
because it values a good relationship with private property owners highly.
All these examples of institutions indicate to us that there is little room for the ‘volun-
tarism’ that some authors have observed in theories of governance in policy networks that
take little notice of institutions and habitual behaviour (Van Tatenhove and Leroy 1995).
5.3 The value of the analytical framework
The analytical framework has enabled us to identify separate stages in the planning process
and to systematically review the goals and instruments chosen, as well as the outcome of
the steering process at these stages. At first glance we might have concluded that the
development of the Hofpoort site has not been effectively steered. The intended number of
houses has been reduced, monumental vaults have not been preserved, the active municipal
role in land readjustment was given up, and the planning process took many years. Our
analysis, however, has clarified that this ‘failure’ is due to a complex set of reasons related
to the subsequent stages of the process. The fact that the city had set goals it could not get
political support for has to do as much with the effectiveness of governance structures as
with professionalism in planning, conflicting interests, changing goals and so on.
Understanding a lagging building production goes beyond the simple answers that are
sometimes given. It requires a thorough insight into dynamic micro-level structures at the
level of the location. The housing production target—80,000–100,000 houses a year—that
the central government sets should take into account—at least much more—what happens
‘on the ground’.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
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References
Bromley, D. W. (1989). Economic interests and institutions. Oxford: Blackwell.
Buitelaar, E. (2007). The cost of land use decisions: Applying transaction cost economics to planning &
development. Oxford: Blackwell.
Evaluating the performance of governance structures 199
123
Buitelaar, E., Mertens, H., Needham, B., & De Kam, G. (2006). Sturend vermogen en woningbouw: een
onderzoek naar het vermogen van gemeenten om te sturen bij de ontwikkeling van woningbouwlo-
caties, [Steering capacity and housing: analysing the municipal capacity to steer housing
development]. Den Haag/Utrecht: DGW/NETHUR.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 386–405.
Coase, R. H. (Ed.). (1988). The firm, the market and the law. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
De Kam, G. (1998). Value for money: Quality and price of land for social housing in The Netherlands.
Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 4, 453–475.
De Kam, G. (2007). Social entrepreneurs in the land market: Dutch housing associations’ strategic response
to institutional change. Paper presented at the ENHR conference 25–28 June 2007 in Rotterdam.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American
Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510.
Groetelaers, D. A. (2004). Instrumenten locatieontwikkeling: sturingsmogelijkheden voor gemeenten in een
veranderde marktsituatie, [Instruments for location development: local possibilities to steer in a
changing market]. Delft: DUP Science.
Healey, P. (1997). Collaborative planning: Shaping places in fragmented societies. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Hirschman, A. O. (1982). Rival interpretations of market society: civilizing, destructive, or feeble. Journal
of Economic Literature, 20, 1463–1484.
Hodgson, G. M. (1988). Economics and institutions: A manifesto for a modern institutional economics.
Cambridge/Philadelphia: Polity Press/University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hodgson, G. M. (2002). The legal nature of the firm and the myth of the firm-market hybrid. International
Journal of the Economics of Business, 1, 37–60.
Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2003). Collaborative policymaking: Governance through dialogue. In M.
Hajer & H. Wagenaar (Eds.), Deliberative policy analysis, understanding governance in the network
society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kickert, W. J. M., Klijn, E.-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (Eds.). (1997). Managing complex networks:
Strategies for the public sector. London: Sage Publications.
Korthals Altes, W. K. (2007). The impact of abolishing social-housing grants on the compact-city policy of
Dutch municipalities. Environment and Planning A, 39, 1497–1512.
Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administrator Review, 19, 78–88.
Lindblom, C. E. (2001). The market system. What it is, how it works and what to make of it. New Haven/
London: Yale University Press.
Mastop, J. M., & Faludi, A. K. F. (1997). Evaluation of strategic plans: The performance principle. Envi-
ronment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 6, 815–832.
McGuinness, T. (1991). Markets and managerial hierarchies. In J. F. G. Thompson, R. Levacic, & J.
Mitchell (Eds.), Markets, networks & hierarchies: The coordination of social life. London: Sage
Publications.
Needham, B., & De Kam, G. (2004). Understanding how land is transacted: Markets, rules and networks, as
illustrated by housing associations. Urban Studies, 10, 2061–2076.
Neuman, M. (2000). Communicate this! Does consensus lead to advocacy and pluralism. Journal of
Planning Education and Research, 19, 343–350.
North, D. C. (1977). Markets and other allocation systems in history: the challenge of Karl Polanyi. Journal
of European Economic History, 6, 703–716.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Powell, W. W. (1991). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. In G. Thompson, J.
Frances, R. Levacic, & J. Mitchell (Eds.), Markets, hierarchies & networks: The coordination of social
life (pp. 265–276). London: Sage Publications.
Richardson, G. B. (1972). The organisation of industry. Economic Journal, 82, 883–896.
Scharpf, F. (1997). Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Thompson, G. F. (2003). Between markets & hierarchies: The logic and limits of network forms of orga-
nization. New York: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R., & Mitchell, J. (Eds.). (1991). Markets, hierarchies & networks: The
coordination of social life. London: Sage.
Thorelli, H. B. (1986). Networks: Between markets and hierarchies. Strategic Management Journal, 1,
37–51.
200 E. Buitelaar, G. de Kam
123
Van Tatenhove, J., & Leroy, P. (1995). Beleidsnetwerken: een kritische analyse. Beleidswetenschap, 2,
128–145.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting.
New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1990). Chester Barnard and the incipient science of organization. In O. E. Williamson
(Ed.), Organization theory: From Chester Barnard to the present and beyond (pp. 172–206). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Evaluating the performance of governance structures 201
123
